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A jury in the Circuit Court for Bal-
timore City convicted Raymond 
Frances Reddick ("Reddick") and 
Harvey Lee Southall of second degree 
murder and the unlawful use of a hand-
gun. Although the sentencing guide-
lines suggested a twenty-five year sen-
tence, Judge Hammerman imposed a 
thirty year sentence for the second de-
gree murder conviction and ten years 
for the handgun violation, to be served 
concurrently. The Judge believed that 
the sentence was justified in light of 
the degree of violence of the crime and 
the devastating impact the defendants' 
actions had on the victim's family. In 
addition, Judge Hammerman was con-
cerned about the fmancial burden the 
defendants' actions had placed upon 
the victim's family. Medical and fu-
neral expenses amounted to $6,000. In 
light of this burden, the Judge offered 
each defendant the opportunity to re-
duce his sentence to twenty-five years 
upon payment of $3,000 individually 
to the victim's mother by February 2, 
1991. 
On appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals ofMaryland, both defendants' 
convictions were affirmed in an unre-
ported opinion. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted Reddick's peti-
tion for certiorari. Reddick contended 
that because he is indigent, the offer to 
reduce his sentence upon making a 
contribution toward the expenses 
placed upon the family of the victim 
was unconstitutional. He asserted that 
this offer constituted an unlawful dis-
tinction among sentences based on a 
defendant's wealth or poverty, and 
therefore violated the Equal Protection 
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and 
Article 24 ofthe Maryland Declaration 
of Rights. To further illustrate his 
position, Reddick argued that it was 
''unconstitutional to incarcerate an in-
digent defendant fora term longer than 
that imposed on a similarly situated 
nonindigent defendant who would be 
able to make the requisite monetary 
payment." Reddick, 327 Md., at 272, 
608 A.2d at 1248. Accordingly, 
Reddick requested that the court va-
cate his entire sentence because of the 
unconstitutional conditional offer to 
suspend five years of his sentence ifhe 
paid the victim's family $3,000. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
rejected the State's characterization of 
the sentence as an unconditional thirty 
year term containing a provision of 
certain conduct, compliance with which 
the defendant would encourage the trial 
judge to modify the sentence. Id. at 
273,608 A.2d at 1248. The court also 
refused to accept the State's alternative 
argument that the trial judge should 
simply strike the illegal language con-
taining the offer and allow the thirty 
year sentence to stand because pennit-
ting suspension of five years of the 
sentence conditioned upon payment of 
the victim's medical and funeral ex-
penses was illegal and, thus, null and 
void. Id. 
Although the court of appeals agreed 
with Reddick's assertion that the offer 
constituted a violation of his rights, the 
court refused to vacate his entire sen-
tence. Id. at 274, 608 A.2d at 1248. 
Instead, the court simply struck the 
illegal portion ofthe sentence and re-
manded the case to the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City with instructions to 
resentence Reddickto a tenn of twenty-
five years. Id. In holding that Judge 
Hammerman's offer to suspend part of 
the sentence in return for contribution 
to the victim's family's expenses was 
unconstitutional, the court stated that 
where a court has "detennined that a 
fine or restitution is an appropriate 
sentence, a court cannot then imprison 
a defendant solely because of his in-
ability to pay it." Reddick, 327 Md. at 
273-74, 608 A.2d at 1248 (citing 
Beardenv. Georgia,461 U.S. 660,665 
(1983». Applying this principle of 
equal protection to the present case, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland charac-
terized Judge Hammerman's offer as a 
chance to "buy" a suspended sentence. 
Reddick v. State, 327 Md. at 273, 608 
A.2d at 1248. The court concluded 
that equal protection required that the 
unconstitutional portion be stricken 
from the sentence; otherwise, it would 
imprison Reddick for a longer term 
thana similarly situated defendant with 
the financial capability to make the 
payment. Id. at 274, 608 A.2dat 1248. 
The court's holding effectively re-
stricts the ability of the sentencing 
judge to allow an indigent defendant 
the opportunity to pay restitution for 
his victim's expenses in order to re-
duce the term of incarceration. Where 
the defendant's actions place heavy 
financial burdens on a victim or his 
family, the court has an interest in 
seeing that the defendant take as much 
responsibility as possible for those ex-
penses. However, an offer ofa reduced 
sentence in exchange for contribution 
towards a victim's family's financial 
burden will run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment where the judge is faced 
with an indigent defendant. Thus, 
despite a court's concern over expenses 
imposed upon a victim's family, the 
court cannot offer a defendant the op-
portunity to pay restitution to his vic-
tims at the expense of the defendant's 
constitutional rights. 
- Paula L. Davis 
Two Pesos, Inc. v. TileD Cabana, Inc.: 
PROTECTION OF INHERENTLY 
DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS 
UNDER LANHAM ACT DOES 
NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF SEC-
ONDARY MEANING. 
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992), the United 
States Supreme Court allowed protec-
tion of a restaurant's inherently dis-
tinctive trade dress under section 43(a) 
of the Trademark: Act of 1946, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (''Lanham 
Act"), which provides protection to 
businesses that are harmed by other 
businesses using false representation 
or description in connection with any 
goods or services. Atfrrming the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court re-
jected the assertion that secondary 
meaning of the trade dress was a requi-
site element of its protection under the 
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Lanham Act. 
In 1978, Taco Cabana, Inc., a fast-
food restaurant which served Mexican 
food, opened in San Antonio, Texas. 
The restaurant consisted of an interior 
dining area and patio decomted in vivid 
colors and Mexican artifacts. Paint-
ings, murals, bright awnings and um-
brellas created a festive, Mexican at-
mosphere. The lively theme was en-
hanced by border paint, neon stripes 
and a stepped exterior. Two Pesos, 
Inc., a Mexican restaurant with a motif 
very similar to that of Taco Cabana, 
opened in Houston in 1985. Two 
Pesos rapidly expanded through Texas, 
but did not enter San Antonio. The 
next year, Taco Cabana entered Hous-
ton and other cities where Two Pesos 
was operating. 
In 1987, Taco Cabana sued Two 
Pesos in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas for 
trade dress infringement under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act. The court 
instructed the jury that trade dress was 
protected if it was either inherently 
distinctive or had acquired a secondary 
meaning. Id. at 2756. A trademark or 
trade dress acquires a secondary mean-
ing when it has become uniquely asso-
ciated with a specific source through 
its use in the marketplace. Id. at 2756 
n.4 (citing Restatement (Third) of Un-
mirCompetition § 13, commente(Tent. 
Draft No. 2, Mar. 23,1990». Thejury 
concluded Taco Cabana had a trade 
dress which was inherently distinctive, 
but which had not acquired a second-
arymeaning. Id. at 2756. Thejuryalso 
held that customers were likely to be 
confused as to the source ofthe goods 
or services by the alleged infringe-
ment. Id. at 2756. Despite the jury's 
finding that there was no secondary 
meaning, the trial court entered judg-
ment for Taco Cabana. Relying on a 
Fifth Circuit decision, the court of ap-
peals affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court and rejected Two Pesos' 
assertion that a finding ofno secondary 
meaning precluded a finding of inher-
ent distinctiveness. Id. Due to the 
conflict among the courts of appeals in 
several circuits as to the requirement of 
secondary meaning, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Court began its analysis by 
noting that the Lanham Act was in-
tended to create a cause of action 
against deceptive and misleading use 
of trademarks and to protect businesses 
againstunfaircompetition. Id. at 2757 
(citing § 45,15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982». 
A trademark consists of "any word, 
name, symbol, or device or any combi-
nation thereof' used by any person ''to 
identify and distinguish his or her 
goods, includingauniqueproduct, from 
those manufactured or sold by others 
and to indicate the source of the goods 
even if that source is unknown." Id. at 
2757 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982». 
The Court explained that a trademark 
must distinguish the particular product 
from others in order to be registered, 
which is significant because the prin-
ciples qualifying a mark for registra-
tion are applicable to the analysis of 
whether an unregistered trademark is 
afforded protection under section 43 (a) 
of the Lanham Act. Id. at 2757 (citing 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1127 (1982». 
The Court identified the categories 
set forth by the Second Circuit to deter-
mine the distinctiveness of the trade-
mark as the following: (1) generic, (2) 
descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbi-
trary, and (5) funciful. Id. at 2757 
(citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World. Inc., 537 F.2d4, 9 (2d 
Cir. 1976». The Court noted that the 
latter three categories are inherently 
distinctive, and, therefore, afforded pro-
tection under the Lanham Act because 
their intrinsic nature identifies the par-
ticular source of the product. [d. at 
2757. 
The Court further explained that 
descriptive marks are not inherently 
distinctive, because they do not neces-
sarily describe the particular source of 
the product, and consequently, cannot 
be protected. Id. However, recogniz-
ing the ability of descriptive marks to 
become distinctive under some cir-
cumstances, the Court cited section 2 
of the Lanham Act which provides that 
a descriptive mark may be registered if 
it has acquired secondary meaning by 
becoming distinctive of the applicant's 
goods in commerce. Id. (citing § § 2( e), 
(t), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), (t) (1982». 
The rule regarding distinctiveness is 
one in which "an identifying mark is 
distinctive and capable of being pro-
tected if it either (1) is inherently-dis-
tinctive or (2) has acquired distinctive-
ness through secondary meaning." Id. 
at 2758 (citing Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition § 13, pp. 37-38, 
and comment a (Tent. Draft No.2, 
Mar. 23, 1990». 
Having assumed the jury was cor-
rect in finding that Taco Cabana's trade 
dress was inherently distinctive, the 
Court directed its attention to whether 
proving the existence of a secondary 
meaning would be required to allow 
protection of an inherently distinctive 
trade dress under the Lanham Act. Id. 
Trade dress is the total image of the 
business, including the exterior ap-
pearance of the restaurant, identifying 
sign, decor, menu, and equipment used 
to serve food. Id. at 2755 n.l. The 
Court concluded that proof of a sec-
ondary meaning was not required. [d 
at 2758. Particularly persuasive to the 
Court was the reasoning of the court of 
appeals that protection ofan inherently 
distinctive trademark or trade dress 
recognized a business owner's interest 
in its unique mark, even though con-
sumers had not yet recognized a unique 
association between the product and 
the source. [d. (quoting Two Pesos. 
Inc. v. Taco Cabana. Inc., 932 F.2d 
1113, 1120 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991». 
Two Pesos conceded that arbitrary 
or fanciful trade dresses which had not 
acquired secondary meaning, but were 
classified as inherently distinctive, 
should have been temporarilyprotected 
to allow time to develop a secondary 
meaning in the market. Id. at 2759. 
Two Pesos argued, however, that if 
secondary meaning did not develop, 
the protection should have then been 
withdrawn. [d. The Court interpreted 
such a proposal by Two Pesos to be a 
recognition of the unfairness inherent 
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in a requirement of proving secondary 
meaning. Emphasizing that protection 
would be given initially only if the 
trade dress were inherently distinctive 
and capable of identifying the source 
of the product, the Court noted that the 
termination of protection would occur 
merely because the business was not 
successful enough in the market. Id 
Denying protection to a unique trade 
dress for this reason was unacceptable 
to the Court, which opined that a busi-
ness in this situation should be afa 
forded protection of its unique trade 
dress while it enhances its recognition 
in the market. Id. 
Rejecting the attempted distinction 
between trade dress and trademarks, 
the Court stated that there is no persua-
sive reason to apply different analyses 
to the two. The Second Circuit al-
lowed protection for suggestive, inher-
ently distinctive trademarks, without 
proof of secondary meaning, but de-
nied protection to trade dress without 
such proof. Id. (citing Thompson 
Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 
208 (2d Cir. 1985». Recognizingthat 
proof of secondary meaning would not 
be required if trademarks were inher-
ently distinctive, the Fifth Circuit held, 
contrary to the Second Circuit, that 
such a rule should also apply to trade 
dress. Id. at 2760 (citing Chevron 
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchas-
ing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 
(5th Cir. 1981». Agreeing with the 
Fifth Circuit, the Court further empha-
sized that protection of trademarks and 
trade dress serves the same end, which 
is to prevent deception and unfair com-
petition. Id. at 2760. Moreover, the 
Court noted that section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act does not mention either 
trademark or trade dress, and it also 
does not mention secondary meaning. 
Although section 1052 of the Lanham 
Act mentions secondary meaning, the 
Court pointed out that the section only 
applies to descriptive marks, not to 
inherently distinct trade dress. Id. at 
2760. 
In further support of its holding that 
secondary meaning was not required, 
the Court expressed concern that a 
secondary meaning requirement for 
inherently distinct trade dress would 
undermine the purpose of the Lanham 
Act. Id. The Court noted that the 
primary purpose of the Lanham Act is 
to protect the goodwill established by 
the owner of a unique trademark and 
the ability of customers to distinguish 
among competing businesses. Id. 
Trademarks also enhance competition 
and quality by securing to businesses 
the benefits of a good reputation. Id. 
(citing Park W Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
andFly,/nc.,469U.S.189,198(1985». 
Requiring proof of secondary meaning 
would deny businesses the security of 
knowing their trade dress was pro-
tected while they improved their mar-
ket standing. Id. 
The Court also rejected the conten-
tion that a business which used a cer-
tain design first would preclude com-
petition by products of similar design. 
Clarifying the status of the law, the 
Court stated that only nonfunctional, 
distinctive trade dress would be pro-
tected by section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. Id. A functional design that is 
only one of a few options for competi-
tors would not be protected, because it 
would hinder free competition. Id. 
However, the Court emphasized that if 
secondary meaning was required, com-
petition could be unduly burdened, 
particularly for small businesses. Such 
a requirement would have allowed a 
competitor the opportunity to use the 
trade dress of the original business in 
new markets, thereby hindering the 
originator's ability to expand. Id. at 
2761. 
In holding that secondary meaning 
is not a required element of protection 
for inherently distinctive trade dress, 
the Two Pesos decision will protect 
small business owners who have cre-
ated a unique image to distinguish 
their business from all others and will 
guard against replication before the 
business is able to establish an associa-
tion between the trade dress and its 
business in the market. Consequently, 
competitors will not be permitted to 
create a business with an atmosphere 
and appearance similar to an existing 
business on the basis that the trade 
dress of the original business has not 
yet established a secondary meaning. 
- Susan L. Oliveri 
Banks v. State: STATEMENTS 
MADE BY VICTIM EXPRESSING 
FEAR OF KILLER NOT ADMIS-
SIBLE TO REBUT EVIDENCE OF 
BA TTERED SPOUSE SYN-
DROME. 
In Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422, 
608 A.2d 1249 (1992), the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
statements made by a victim prior to 
his death expressing fear of his killer 
were inadmissible to rebut evidence of 
the battered spouse syndrome. The 
court found that the statements at issue 
were hearsay and did not fit into any of 
the hearsay exceptions. 
In the early evening hours of Au-
gust 14, 1990, Thelma Jean Banks 
("Banks") called the Baltimore City 
Police and reported that her boyfriend, 
James McDonald ("McDonald"), had 
been stabbed. When the police ar-
rived, McDonald was dead. Banks 
initially told police that she had been 
upstairs when intruders broke into the 
house and stabbed McDonald, but she 
eventually admitted that she stabbed 
the victim. 
Banks was convicted of second 
degree murder by a jwy in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City and was sen-
tenced to a term of twenty years in 
prison. At trial, Banks maintained that 
she suffered from battered spouse syn-
drome when she stabbed McDonald. 
In support of this defense, Banks testi-
fied that the victim drank heavily and 
often physically abused her. Five other 
witnesses also testified that the victim 
had abused Banks. 
In an attempt to rebut the evidence 
supporting the battered spouse syn-
drome defense, the state offered the 
victim's mother and sister who testi-
fied that McDonald told them he was 
afraid of Banks because she physically 
abused him. Lucille McDonald, the 
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